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Simmons v. South Carolina: Safeguarding a Capital
Defendant's Right to Fair Sentencing
I. INTRODUCTION
In Simmons v. South Carolina,' the United States Supreme Court
held that, in a capital sentencing proceeding where the State argues
future dangerousness, a defendant has the right to inform the
sentencer2 of his or her parole ineligibility.' The Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a capital
defendant's right to present this information.4 Two concurring
Justices further argued that the Eighth Amendment also entitles a
defendant to inform the sentencer of his or her parole ineligibility.'
The Court's decision safeguards capital defendants against unwar-
ranted death sentences based on jurors' misperceptions about the true
nature of sentencing alternatives. Because jurors may believe that a
sentence of "life imprisonment" carries with it the possibility of
parole,6 a state which does not inform the sentencing jury that a
1. 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
2. Throughout this Note, the term "sentencer" refers to both sentencing juries and
sentencing judges. Simmons impacts both of these groups. See infra part V.A-B.
3. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
4. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property. without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV; see infra part II.B.
5. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring). The majority of Justices
declined to analyze the issue under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 2193 n.4 (plurality
opinion) (declining to reach the Eighth Amendment issue); id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (discussing only the Due Process Clause).
The Eighth Amendment proscribes "cruel and unusual punishment." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. While the Eighth Amendment, on its face, applies only to the federal
government, the Court incorporated it into the Fourteenth Amendment in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), thus making the Eighth Amendment's limits
applicable to the states. In Robinson, the Court held that imposition of criminal
punishment for narcotics addiction constituted "cruel and unusual" punishment because
such punishment was disproportionate to the "offense." 370 U.S. at 667. See infra note
26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Eighth Amendment's proscription on
disproportionate punishment.
6. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2197 (plurality opinion) (refusing to ignore "the
reality, known to 'the reasonable juror,' that, historically, life-term defendants have
been eligible for parole" (quoting State v. Smith, 381 S.E.2d 724, 728 (S.C. 1989)
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defendant is ineligible for parole presents the jury with a false choice.7
Such states place defendants at risk of receiving unwarranted death
sentences.8 The Simmons Court held that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects a parole ineligible capital defendant in this situation, at least when
the prosecution argues that the defendant will be a future danger to
(Chandler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))); see also infra notes 212-14
and accompanying text (discussing possible consequences of jurors' misperception of
life imprisonment).
7. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193 (plurality opinion) (stating that the jury's possible
erroneous belief that the defendant was eligible for parole "creat[ed] a false choice
between sentencing petitioner to death and sentencing him to a limited period of
incarceration.").
In his brief, Simmons explained the development of the life without parole sentencing
alternative and the corresponding need for changes in evidentiary rules:
[M]any states prohibit capital sentencing juries from considering the
availability of parole, pardon or commutation. These state law rules
developed in an era when release on parole was widely available for life-
sentenced murderers, and the various states' prohibitions against instructions
or jury argument concerning parole were designed to protect capital defendants
from jury speculation concerning the likelihood of early parole release if the
death penalty was not imposed. In recent years, however, with the steady
expansion of "life without parole" statutes, parole for life-sentenced murderers
has increasingly moved from a real possibility to a jury-room myth,
unfounded in reality but ever-present in the deliberations of capital sentencing
juries. And with this change, rules that once protected capital defendants from
potentially harmful speculation now serve to increase the danger of death
sentences based on jurors' misinformed fear of parole release. This case
illustrates in stark form the unfairness that can result when the crucial fact of a
defendant's lifelong parole ineligibility is withheld from the jury that must
sentence him.
Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (No.
92-9059) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S.
992, 1013 n.30 (1983)).
Agreeing with the petitioner's analysis, Justice Blackmun stated:
It can hardly be questioned that most juries lack accurate information about
the precise meaning of "life imprisonment" as defined by the States. For much
of our country's history, parole was a mainstay of state and federal sentencing
regimes, and every term... in practice was understood to be shorter than the
stated term. Increasingly, legislatures have enacted mandatory sentencing
laws with severe penalty provisions, yet the precise contours of these penal
laws vary from State to State.
Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2197 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
Justice O'Connor also agreed. She stated that "[the rejection of parole by many States
(and the Federal Government) is a recent development that displaces the long-standing
practice of parole availability, and common sense tells us that many jurors might not
know whether a life sentence carries with it the possibility of parole." Id. at 2201
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
8. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text for studies demonstrating the
correlation between jurors' perception of the length of a life sentence and their
propensity to sentence to death.
Simmons v. South Carolina
society. 9
This Note explores the Court's development of procedural and
substantive limits on capital sentencing under the Eighth Amendment'0
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." This
Note discusses the facts in Simmons, 12 and then discusses the
Simmons plurality, 3 concurring, 4 and dissenting opinions. Then,
this Note analyzes the Justices' positions in Simmons. 16 Next, this
Note explores the current impact of the Simmons decision on capital
defendants and on state law, and predicts that the Court may eventually
extend Simmons to require states to allow capital defendants to inform
sentencers of parole ineligibility in all cases. 17 Finally, this Note
concludes that the Court's decision in Simmons properly safeguards a
capital defendant's right to fair sentencing. 8
II. BACKGROUND
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment" upon criminals.' 9 The
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees an individual "due process of law"
before any state can deprive that person of "life, liberty, or prop-
erty. 20 In developing procedural and substantive limits on states'
capital sentencing, the Supreme Court has traditionally relied on the
language of these two Amendments.2'
A. Eighth Amendment Limits on Imposing the Death Penalty
In Gregg v. Georgia,22 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment does not proscribe the death penalty as per se "cruel and
unusual punishment."23 Since Gregg, however, the Court has recog-
9. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
10. See infra part II.A.
11. See infra part ll.B.
12. See infra part III.A.
13. See infra part III.B.
14. See infra part III.C.
15. See infra part III.D.
16. See infra part IV.
17. See infra part V.
18. See infra part VI.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
21. See infra part II.A-B.
22. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23. Id. at 169 (plurality opinion); id. at 207 (White, J., concurring) (declaring that
19951 513
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nized that the Eighth Amendment does place substantial restrictions
upon the imposition of the death penalty. 
4
Under its plain meaning, the Amendment prohibits torture. The
Court has held that the Eighth Amendment also mandates that states
impose punishments which are proportional to the crimes committed26
the death penalty may be constitutionally imposed under the Georgia capital sentencing
scheme).
As the plurality in Gregg explained, prior to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
the Court assumed the constitutionality of the death penalty when deciding whether the
Eighth Amendment prohibited particular methods of execution. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168
(plurality opinion). However, in Furman, the defendant challenged the death penalty as
per se unconstitutional, claiming it constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 408 U.S. at 239. In striking down the Georgia
death penalty statute, the Justices wrote nine separate opinions. Four Justices stated
that the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id.
at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Two Justices determined that the death penalty is
always unconstitutional. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Finally, three Justices held the death penalty unconstitutional as applied in
the case before the Court, but declined to decide whether states could constitutionally
impose the death penalty under other circumstances. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
The Court explicitly decided the constitutionality of the death penalty for the first time
in Gregg. 428 U.S. at 168-69 (plurality opinion); id. at 207 (White, J., concurring). In
that case, the State convicted the defendant on two counts of armed robbery and two
counts of murder. Id. at 160 (plurality opinion). The court then sentenced him to death.
Id. at 161 (plurality opinion). In place of the capital sentencing scheme which the
Supreme Court invalidated in Furman, Georgia had implemented a bifurcated sentencing
scheme. Id. at 162-63 (plurality opinion). See infra note 36 for more detail on the
structure of the death penalty scheme used in Gregg. The Court held Georgia's death
penalty scheme constitutional and affirmed the defendant's death sentence. Gregg, 428
U.S. at 207 (plurality opinion); id. (White, J., concurring). The majority of Justices,
thus, declared that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposition of the death
penalty. Id. (plurality opinion); id. (White, J., concurring).
24. See infra part II.A.1-2.
25. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169-71 (plurality opinion) (discussing the history of the
Eighth Amendment ban on "cruel and unusual punishment"); see also Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (noting that the Eighth Amendment proscribes "physically
barbarous punishments" (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976))). See
generally Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 841-42 (1969) (explaining that the framers of
the Bill of Rights intended the cruel and unusual punishment clause to prohibit torture).
26. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685; see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983)
(noting that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also
sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed"). Applying this principle,
the Court held the death penalty unconstitutional as disproportionate to the crime of
robbery in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982), and to the crime of rape in
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
In Gregg, however, Justice Stewart, with two Justices joining the opinion, remarked
that the death penalty does not invariably constitute disproportionate punishment: "It
is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes." 428 U.S. at 187
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and which comport with modem "'concepts of dignity, civilized stan-
dards, humanity, and decency.'" Cognizant of the unique severity
and finality of the death penalty,28 the Supreme Court has scrutinized
the constitutionality of capital sentencing proceedings with particular
sensitivity. 29 Limits developed by the Supreme Court under an Eighth
Amendment analysis are discussed in turn below.
1. Procedural Limits
The Eighth Amendment requires procedural safeguards on the
imposition of the death penalty. 30 According to the Supreme Court,
the Constitution prohibits mandatory imposition of the death penalty.3'
(plurality opinion).
27. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)); see
also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-71 (1989) (indicating that the Court must
look to modern American society as a whole to discern evolving standards of decency);
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality opinion) (noting that the Court
will examine capital sentencing procedures against evolving standards in a civilized
society); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(stating that "[clentral to the application of the [Eighth] Amendment is a determination
of contemporary standards regarding the infliction of punishment").
28. For example, in Woodson, the plurality noted that, while the Constitution does
not generally require individualized sentencing determinations, the "fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment" mandates individualized sentencing in
capital cases. 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion). The plurality reasoned that "the
penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however
long," and, thus, concluded that heightened reliability is required in capital sentencing.
Id. at 305 (plurality opinion). However, Supreme Court Justices have also recognized
that the retributive function of the death penalty is "essential in an ordered society."
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion).
29. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion).
30. In examining the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty, the Supreme
Court has primarily focused on state procedures because states have traditionally dictated
the substantive factors relevant to capital sentencing. See id. at 176 (plurality opinion)
(reasoning that "[tihe deference we owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under
our federal system is enhanced where the specification of punishments is concerned, for
'these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy."' (citation omitted) (quoting Gore
v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958))). The Court also quoted this exact language
used by the Gregg plurality in California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1000 (1983). See
also Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2009 (1994) (remarking that "'the States
enjoy their traditional latitude to prescribe the method by which those who commit
murder shall be punished."' (quoting Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 309
(1990))).
31. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1977) [hereinafter Roberts I1];
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (plurality opinion) [hereinafter Roberts
I]; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion).
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Court held several capital sentencing
schemes unconstitutional because the schemes allowed sentencing juries unbridled
discretion in choosing between death and life imprisonment. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). The Court found that sentencers imposed death sentences "wantonly" and
"freakishly," and, thus, unconstitutionally. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Thus, a state may not automatically impose a death sentence upon a
defendant convicted for a particular crime.32 Rather, the Eighth
Amendment entitles defendants to individualized sentencing 33 to
prevent arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.34 To
achieve individualized sentencing, states must genuinely narrow the
class of defendants eligible for the death penalty 35 by using
In response to Furman, several states enacted statutes mandating the imposition of the
death penalty when the State convicted the defendant of certain narrowly defined crimes.
See Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (1993) (noting that, after Furman, at least
35 states abandoned sentencing schemes which gave the jury complete discretion and
that some of those states adopted a mandatory death penalty for certain crimes). The
Court, however, struck down mandatory death penalty statutes because they did not allow
for individualized sentencing. See, e.g., Roberts 1, 428 U.S. at 333-34 (plurality
opinion) (holding Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional);
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion) (holding North Carolina's mandatory
death penalty statute unconstitutional).
32. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion) (striking down North
Carolina's automatic death sentence as unconstitutional).
33. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
34. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion) (explaining that a capital sentencing
scheme must "minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action"). This exact
language from Gregg has been quoted in several other seminal Supreme Court cases. See
Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2009 (discussing generally the Eighth Amendment limitations
on the death penalty); Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1540 (1993) (concluding that a
finding of "utter disregard" for human life as a prerequisite to the imposition of the death
penalty is constitutional); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 766, 774 (1990) (finding
constitutional the use of "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" as an aggravating
circumstance); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1982) (holding that the Georgia
death penalty scheme sufficiently avoided arbitrary and capricious action); see also
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990) (holding that "above all, capital sentencing
must be reliable, accurate, and non-arbitrary"); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306-
08 (1987) (discussing defendant's contention that Georgia's death penalty scheme
operated arbitrarily and capriciously and, thus, unconstitutionally); Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that a finding of "outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" as a prerequisite to the imposition of the death
penalty did not avoid arbitrary and capricious action); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
252-53 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding Florida's capital sentencing scheme
constitutional because it assures that the death penalty will not be imposed in an
arbitrary or capricious manner).
Not only must the entire capital sentencing scheme operate to protect against arbitrary
and capricious imposition of the death penalty, but when a state employs aggravating
factors to determine which defendants are eligible for the death penalty, those factors
must be construed and applied in a non-arbitrary manner. Alabama v. Evans, 461 U.S.
230, 233 (1983). See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
role of aggravating factors.
35. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 (holding that an aggravating circumstance "must genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty"). Other Supreme Court cases
have quoted this exact language from Zant. See Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2009 (discussing
generally the Eighth Amendment limitations on the death penalty); Arave, 113 S. Ct. at
1542 (concluding that a finding of "utter disregard" for human life as a prerequisite to the
imposition of the death penalty is constitutional); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,
1995] Simmons v. South Carolina
aggravating factors.36
State legislatures may choose one of two ways to incorporate
aggravating factors into death penalty sentencing schemes.37 First, a
state may adopt a bifurcated sentencing scheme in which the trier of
fact determines the defendant's guilt before any consideration of pos-
sible sentences.38 During the sentencing phase of the trial, the
244 (1988) (clarifying that a capital sentencing scheme may narrow the death-eligible
class of defendants by narrowly defining the crime or by using aggravating factors).
To narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty, a state must ensure
that only the most morally reprehensible defendants are eligible for the death penalty.
See Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 & n.15 (noting that a state must justify the imposition of a
more severe penalty, such as execution of the defendant, compared to sentences imposed
on others found guilty of murder). See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text for the
methods of narrowing the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty which the
Court has endorsed.
36. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (1994). The Tuilaepa Court stated
that "[t]o render a defendant eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case, we have
indicated that the trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one
.aggravating circumstance' (or its equivalent)." Id.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "aggravating circumstance" by reference to the term
"aggravation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 65 (6th ed. 1990). "Aggravation" is defined
as "[a]ny circumstance attending the commission of a crime ... which increases its...
enormity or adds to its injurious consequences." Id. Therefore, aggravating factors set
death-eligible defendants apart from the majority of defendants convicted of a crime.
The Georgia death penalty scheme held constitutional in Gregg provides a good
example of one way in which states use aggravating factors. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207
(plurality opinion); id. (White, J., concurring). The Georgia statute defined murder
broadly as follows: "A person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice
aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being." GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1972). Convicted murderers, however, were not eligible for the
death penalty unless the sentencer, in a post-trial sentencing proceeding, found the
existence of at least one of ten statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-65 (plurality opinion). Examples of Georgia's statutory
aggravating circumstances included: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a
capital felony; (2) the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one
person in a public place; (3) the defendant committed murder for money; (4) the victim
was a police officer; or (5) the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975). If a statutory aggravating
circumstance existed, the sentencer was then required to decide whether or not to actually
impose the death penalty. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165-66 (plurality opinion).
For additional examples of statutory aggravating circumstances, see Arave, 113 S. Ct.
at 1540; Lewis, 497 U.S. at 766, 774; see also supra note 34 (discussing specific
aggravating factors which the Court has considered).
37. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2634.
38. Id. A bifurcated trial safeguards the defendant's right to a fair trial because much
of the wide range of evidence which is relevant in the sentencing phase of the trial is
irrelevant to the guilt phase. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text; see also
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-92 (plurality opinion) (discussing the importance of a bifurcated
proceeding). A bifurcated proceeding prevents the trier of fact in the guilt phase from
considering irrelevant evidence, both positive and negative, in reaching the verdict. Id.
(plurality opinion).
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sentencer must find that at least one statutory aggravating factor exists
before the convicted defendant becomes eligible for the death
penalty.39 Second, a state may incorporate aggravating factors into the
definition of a crime.40 Thus, all defendants convicted of the crime are
eligible for the death penalty.4'
Once the trier of fact determines that a defendant is eligible for the
death penalty, the Eighth Amendment places further limits on the
sentencer's decision.42 States must direct and limit the sentencer's
discretion to decide whether or not to impose the death penalty. 3
Clear and objective standards,44 which provide specific and detailed
39. See Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2634 (explaining that aggravating factors may be
considered in the penalty phase of a trial); Zant, 462 U.S. at 879 (approving the Georgia
death penalty scheme in which aggravating factors were considered in the penalty phase
of the trial to determine death eligibility); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163-64, 207 (plurality
opinion) (same).
40. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635; see also Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244-45
(explaining that the function of an aggravating' factor, namely narrowing the class of
death-eligible defendants, may be accomplished by narrowing the definition of a crime).
41. Note the difference between this situation and mandatory imposition of the death
penalty. Under mandatory death penalty schemes, once a defendant is convicted,
imposition of death is automatic. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. In
contrast, when states narrow the definition of a crime to incorporate an aggravating
factor, conviction merely makes the defendant eligible for imposition of the death
penalty. The sentencer must still decide whether or not execution is the appropriate
punishment for each eligible defendant.
See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substantive
restraints on aggravating factors.
42. When states incorporate an aggravating factor into the definition of a crime, the
trier of fact in the guilt phase of the trial will determine death eligibility. See supra
notes 40-41 and accompanying text. Otherwise, the aggravating factor will be
considered by the sentencer in determining death eligibility. See supra note 36.
43. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the discretion of
capital sentencers must be "suitably directed and limited"). Other Supreme Court
opinions have quoted this exact language from Gregg. See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 113
S. Ct. 1534, 1540 (1994); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990); see also Maynard
v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988) (stating that a state capital sentencing scheme
must channel and limit the sentencer's discretion).
The plurality in Gregg noted that a separate sentencing proceeding, in which the
sentencer weighs aggravating and mitigating circumstances, satisfies this objective.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-94 (plurality opinion); see also Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that unbridled jury discretion is
constitutionally intolerable).
Note, however, that states may not limit a sentencer's discretion to consider
mitigating factors. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987) (contrasting the
limits that states must place on sentencers' consideration of aggravating factors with
the wide discretion that states must allow sentencers in considering mitigating factors);
see also infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
44. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (plurality opinion) (approving Georgia's death penalty
scheme because the sentencing jury's discretion was "controlled by clear and objective
standards" (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974))). Several other
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guidance to the sentencer, ensure the constitutionality of a death
sentence.45 Thus, a capital sentencer must make an individualized
determination,46 within a clear framework provided by the state, of
whether the death penalty is the appropriate punishment for a
defendant. 47  A state sentencing scheme thus ensures reliability, as
mandated by the Eighth Amendment.4'
Reliability is predicated on a capital sentencing scheme which
meaningfully distinguishes between those cases in which a state
imposes the death penalty and those in which it does not.49 Accor-
dingly, the Supreme Court has found that while the Eighth
Amendment does not mandate proportionality review by higher
courts, ° it does require states to formulate rationally reviewable
Supreme Court cases have quoted this exact language from Gregg. See, e.g., Arave, 113
S. Ct. at 1540; Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774; Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980)
(plurality opinion); see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion) (holding
that objective standards should guide the process of imposing death).
45. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discussing with
approval the Florida capital sentencing scheme because it gave the sentencer "specific
and detailed guidance" to assist in the decision of whether to impose the death penalty).
Several other Supreme Court cases have quoted this exact language from Proffitt. See,
e.g., Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1540; Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428
(plurality opinion); see also Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364 (finding that an aggravating
factor of "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" did not sufficiently guide the
sentencing jury).
46. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
48. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319
(1989); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625, 638 (1980) (declaring that procedures which diminish reliability are invalid).
Note that the discretion vested in state officials at various stages in a criminal
proceeding is constitutionally permissible. See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 254 (plurality
opinion) (stating that the prosecutor's discretion whether to charge a capital offense.
the prosecutor's discretion whether to plea bargain, and the Executive's discretion
whether to commute a death sentence are constitutionally permissible).
49. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 3.13 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (stating
that a capital sentencing scheme must provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which ... [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not").
Other Supreme Court cases have quoted this exact language from Furman. See, e.g.,
Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427-28 (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional an
aggravating factor that the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman" because the factor could reasonably be applied to all murders); Gregg, 428
U.S. at 188, 207 (plurality opinion) (rejecting facial challenges to several Georgia
aggravating factors); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984)
(explaining that a state must administer the death penalty in a way that rationally
distinguishes between those defendants "for whom death is an appropriate sanction and
those for whom it is not"); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (stating that an
aggravating factor must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on
defendants eligible for the death penalty as compared to others found guilty of murder).
50. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258 (plurality
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sentencing procedures." The Eighth Amendment does not, however,
require perfect congruence between similarly situated defendants and
the severity of their punishments.52
2. Substantive Limits
The Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, also
places substantive limits upon capital sentencing. The Supreme
Court's intense scrutiny of capital sentencing procedures" does not
usually extend to state substantive laws regarding which factors a
sentencer should consider in deciding whether to impose the death
penalty.' 4 Instead, the Court generally defers to the states' choices. 55
opinion) (noting that the Eighth Amendment did not require the Florida Supreme Court
to formulate a rigid objective test for review of death sentences).
It is important to note the difference between proportionality review and the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of disproportionate punishment. Under proportionality
review, the court evaluates the defendant's sentence as compared to the sentences of
similarly situated defendants. See generally Pulley, 465 U.S. at 42-45 (discussing
proportionality review generally and rejecting the defendant's claim that the
Constitution requires proportionality review). The Eighth Amendment ban on
disproportionate punishment refers to the correlation between the defendant's crime and
the severity of the punishment. Id.; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
51. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion) (explaining that death penalty
schemes must include objective standards to "make rationally reviewable the process for
imposing a sentence of death"). This exact language from Woodson has been quoted in
several other Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1540
(1993) (stating that statutory aggravating circumstances must provide objective
standards); Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774 (same); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (plurality opinion)
(same).
In using the "rationally reviewable" language, the Court appears to be indicating that
death penalty schemes must clearly set forth the basis upon which a sentencer may
impose death so that a reviewing court is able to reasonably determine if any reversible
error was made.
52. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987). The McCleskey Court
rejected the defendant's contention that application of the Georgia capital punishment
scheme was unconstitutional because McCleskey, who is African-American, was
sentenced to death while similarly situated white defendants did not receive the death
penalty. Id. at 283, 308. The Court found uncompelling a statistical study which
showed a higher incidence of imposition of the death penalty for African-American
defendants as compared to similarly situated white defendants. Id. at 312. The Court
noted that "[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal
justice system," id. (footnote omitted), and that "'there can be "no perfect procedure for
deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death,' .... id. at
313 (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 884 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)
(plurality opinion)). The Court further noted that in 1984 Congress created the United
States Sentencing Commission to develop sentencing guidelines to prevent
"unwarranted" discrepancies. Id. at 312 n.35.
53. See supra part II.A.1.
54. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2009 (1994) (noting that "'the
Court's principal concern has been more with the procedure by which the State imposes
the death sentence than with the substantive factors the State lays before the jury as a
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The Eighth Amendment, however, requires states to choose aggra-
vating factors which provide a principled basis for imposing death
over a lesser sentence. 6
Thus, states cannot set forth aggravating factors which a sentencer
could perceive to apply to all capital defendants.57 Furthermore, if an
aggravating factor is too vague, the Court will strike it down as
unconstitutional because vague factors do not sufficiently guide the
sentencer. 58 Under these circumstances, when the content of the
basis for imposing death"' (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983))
(emphasis in original)).
55. See generally Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1001 (explaining that, beyond delineating
constitutional limitations on capital sentencing, the Court has deferred to the states'
choices of substantive sentencing factors). This deference is due to the traditional role
of state legislatures in dictating what actions by a defendant will warrant a particular
punishment. See supra note 30.
56. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1542 (upholding an Idaho aggravating factor as providing a
principled basis for distinguishing between defendants who deserve capital punishment
and defendants who do not); see also Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774 (citing Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)) (noting that death penalty statutes
must provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which the death
penalty is imposed from the many cases in which it is not); Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 460 (1984) (citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 877) (noting that states must administer
the death penalty "in a way that can rationally distinguish between those individuals for
whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not"); Godfrey, 446 U.S.
at 427 (plurality opinion) (noting that a state sentencing scheme must provide a
."'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not""' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188
(1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)))
(alteration in Godfrey).
See infra note 58 for some examples of aggravating factors which the Court has
declared fulfill this requirement.
57. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1542; see also Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2635
(1994) (indicating that an aggravating factor may not apply to every defendant);
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 (1988) (finding unconstitutional an
Oklahoma aggravating factor that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel" because an ordinary person could honestly believe it applied to all murders);
Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29 (plurality opinion) (holding a Georgia aggravating
circumstance unconstitutional because a person of ordinary sensibility could fairly
characterize all murders in that way).
For the purposes of this Note, the term "capital defendant" refers to any defendant who
commits a crime for which the death penalty is a possible punishment.
58. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635; Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528, 534 (1992);
Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926, 2928 (1992); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (plurality
opinion); see also Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361-62 (indicating that an aggravating factor is
too vague under the Eighth Amendment if it leaves sentencers with open-ended
discretion).
In Tuilaepa, the Court noted that "difficulty in application is not equivalent to
vagueness." 114 S. Ct. at 2637. In addition, vagueness review is "quite deferential." Id.
at 2635. Thus, the Court has often upheld aggravating factors against vagueness
challenges. Id. at 2636; see Arave 113 S. Ct. at 1541-42 (upholding an aggravating
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substantive factors jeopardizes procedural safeguards, the Court will
declare a state's approach unconstitutional.5 9
The Court will also scrutinize the factors considered in capital
sentencing proceedings to ensure that a jury has made an indi-
vidualized sentencing decision.' Individualized sentencing requires
that sentencers consider the character and the record of the individual
defendant and the particular circumstances of the offense. 6' Finally,
factor that the defendant was a "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer"); Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 654-55 (1990) (upholding an aggravating factor that the defendant inflicted
mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding an aggravating factor that the
defendant committed a conscienceless or pitiless crime which was unnecessarily
torturous to the victim); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (upholding an aggravating factor that the defendant would constitute a
continuing threat to society).
Narrow construction by state courts can render unconstitutionally vague aggravating
factors constitutional. See, e.g., A rave, 113 S. Ct. at 1541 (indicating that if an
aggravating factor is too vague to provide guidance to the sentencer, the Court must
determine if state courts have further defined the factor in a constitutionally sufficient
manner); see also Richmond, 113 S. Ct. at 534 (noting that a court may rely upon an
adequate narrowing construction of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor);
Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774 (holding that a constitutionally narrow construction of a facially
vague aggravating circumstance meets the Eighth Amendment requirement of channeling
the sentencer's discretion); Alabama v. Evans, 461 U.S. 230, 233 (1983) (finding the
application of an aggravating factor, as construed by the Alabama courts,
constitutional). Compare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), which rejected a
facial attack on an aggravating factor that the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible and inhuman," id. at 200 (plurality opinion), with Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
at 428, which struck down the same factor as applied by the Georgia courts, id. (plurality
opinion).
59. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
60. See Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635 (explaining that sentencing in a capital case
must be an "'individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual
and the circumstances of the crime"' (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 879)) (emphasis in
original); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492 (1990) (stating that, in a capital case,
sentencing must be an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death
penalty (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring))).
See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (requiring that the sentencer
treat the defendant as a "'uniquely individual human bein[g]"' (quoting Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original));
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810 (1989) (noting that the defendant's
punishment must be tailored to his or her personal responsibility).
61. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635 (citing Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299,
307 (1990)) (indicating that the individualized sentencing requirement is met when the
sentencer "can consider relevant mitigating evidence of the character and record of the
defendant and the circumstances of the crime"); Zant, 462 U.S. at 879 (noting that an
individualized determination should be based on the character of the individual and the
circumstances of the crime); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1981)
(explaining that the Eighth Amendment "'requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
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under the Eighth Amendment's substantive limits, sentencers must
also consider all relevant mitigating evidence 62 that the defendant offers
as a basis for a sentence less than death.63
B. Due Process Clause Limits on Imposition of the
Death Penalty
In addition to the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on capital sentencing
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death"'
(quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion))).
62. Mitigating evidence is evidence of circumstances which "do not constitute a
justification or excuse for the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may
be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability." BLACK'S LAW
DICTnONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990).
63. Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2635; Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2009
(1994); Blystone, 494 U.S. at 305; Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 76 (1987);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 277, 302 (1987); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14; Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S.
633, 637 (1977); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion); see also Johnson v.
Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2666 (1993) (declaring that a state may not place relevant
mitigating evidence beyond the sentencer's reach); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892,
902 (1993) (finding no error where the defendant was allowed to place all of his
mitigating evidence before the jury); Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (clarifying the Eddings
holding that not only must states allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence,
but the sentencer must also be able to give effect to that evidence); Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (holding that the sentencer must consider nonstatutory as
well as statutory mitigating evidence); Brown, 479 U.S. at 547 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(noting that a sentencing instruction is invalid if it precludes the sentencer from
considering mitigating evidence); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986)
(holding that evidence is mitigating if it serves as a basis for a sentence less than death).
In McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), the Court struck down a state
statute which required the sentencing jury to consider only those mitigating
circumstances which the jury unanimously found present. Id. at 442. The Court clarified
that "[tihe Constitution requires States to allow consideration of mitigating evidence in
capital cases. Any barrier to such consideration must therefore fall." Id. (emphasis in
original). Furthermore, "it is not relevant whether the barrier . .. is interposed by
statute, by the sentencing court, or by an evidentiary ruling." Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367, 375 (1988) (citations omitted).
The Simmons plurality analogized Simmons' situation to that of the defendant in
Skipper. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194 (plurality opinion) (citing Skipper, 476 U.S. at
5). In Skipper, the defendant sought to introduce into his capital sentencing proceeding
evidence that he had adapted well to prison life. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 3. The
prosecution argued that the defendant would be a future danger to other inmates if he were
sentenced to life imprisonment rather then death. Id. at 5 n. I. The majority held that
the State's refusal to admit that evidence violated the defendant's Eighth Amendment
right to present all relevant mitigating evidence offered as a basis for imposing a
sentence less than death. Id. at 4-5. The Court explained in a footnote that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constituted an additional basis for the
Court's holding. Id. at 5 n.l. The Simmons plurality emphasized the due process
component of Skipper. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194 (plurality opinion).
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schemes. The Supreme Court's due process analysis of criminal pro-
ceedings revolves around the concept of "fundamental fairness."'
The Due Process Clause entitles a criminal defendant to present
evidence to rebut the prosecution's case.65 A state may not prevent the
defendant from introducing evidence in response to the prosecution's
argument.66 Due process, therefore, guarantees the defendant the
opportunity to present information to permit the trier of fact to make a
fully informed determination.67
64. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (explaining that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides a mechanism for relief when a trial is "fundamentally unfair");
Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 121 (1991) (noting that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is primarily concerned with fairness because the clause
represents "'a profound attitude of fairness ... between the individual and government"'
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)));
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 725 (1969)) (explaining that the concept of due process embodies
fundamental notions of fairness); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1967)
(noting that due process requires states to give criminal defendants "all those safeguards
which are fundamental rights and essential to a fair trial").
65. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 83 (holding that Oklahoma's denial of the defendant's
opportunity to rebut the prosecution's evidence of future dangerousness in a capital
sentencing proceeding violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
see also Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.1 (explaining that the defendant has a due process right
to rebut the prosecutor's argument); cf. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (holding that victim
impact statements are admissible in the sentencing phase of a capital trial despite the
fact that the defendant may not find it prudent to rebut such evidence).
In particular, the Court has focused on the defendant's right to "a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690
(1986) (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). The Crane Court
further clarified that defendants have a "fundamental constitutional right to a fair
opportunity to present a defense." Id. at 687 (citing Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485).
66. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 (indicating that a defendant's opportunity to present a
complete defense would be meaningless if the State could exclude evidence which was
central to the defendant's claim).
67. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82. The Court's language can be interpreted to mean that the
State cannot prevent both sides of an issue from being presented to a trier of fact. For
example, in a capital sentencing proceeding, if the State uses a psychiatrist's testimony
to argue that an indigent defendant will be a future danger to society, the State must fund
a psychiatrist for the defendant so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to argue that
he will not be a danger. See id. at 83.
In analyzing some due process claims, the Court has weighed three factors in
determining whether a particular state action violates the defendant's due process rights.
See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (using the factors to evaluate the guilt and sentencing
phases of a capital trial); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1981) (using the three
factors to determine that an indigent putative father has a right to state-funded blood
grouping tests in a paternity action); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)
(using the three factors to determine that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to
the termination of disability benefits). Specifically, the Court has weighed (1) the
defendant's interest, (2) the state's interest, and (3) the probable value of the safeguard
sought by the defendant and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the defendant's
19951 Simmons v. South Carolina 525
The Court recognized a criminal defendant's fundamental right to be
heard 68 in both the guilt 69 and the sentencing phases of trials.7° Like
criminal trials, capital sentencing proceedings are adversarial.71 Thus,
when the prosecution argues for imposition of the death penalty, the
Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to rebut that
argument.72 Essentially, a state may not sentence a defendant to death
on the basis of information which the defendant had "no opportunity to
deny or explain.' 73
interest without the safeguard. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77. In the context of capital
sentencing, the Court has determined that both the defendant's interest and the state's
interest lie primarily in fair, accurate imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 83-84.
Because both of these interests indicate that defendants should be entitled to special
safeguards in capital sentencing proceedings, the Court has focused primarily on the
third factor to determine if the defendant is entitled to the additional safeguard that he or
she seeks. Id. at 84.
68. Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)); Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967).
69. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690-91 (holding that Kentucky violated the defendant's
due process rights when it banned evidence as to the environment in which his
confession was made because that ban effectively disabled the defendant from attacking
the credibility of the confession); Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 (holding that Oklahoma
violated the defendant's due process rights by failing to fund a psychiatrist for the
indigent defendant when the defendant's sanity was a significant factor in his defense at
trial).
70. See Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 126-27 (1991) (holding that Idaho violated
the defendant's due process rights by failing to inform the defendant that the judge was
considering death as a possible sentence, thus denying the defendant an opportunity to
argue against the imposition of death); Ake, 470 U.S. at 83 (holding that Oklahoma
violated the defendant's due process rights by failing to fund a psychiatrist for the
indigent defendant when the State relied on psychiatric testimony of the defendant's
future dangerousness in arguing for the death penalty); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95,
96-97 (1979) (per curiam) (holding that Georgia violated the defendant's due process
rights by excluding, during the defendant's capital sentencing proceeding, testimony
that the defendant was not present when the victim was killed); Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that the defendant's death sentence,
which was based, in part, on a presentence report to which the defendant did not have
access, and, thus, the opportunity "to deny or explain," violated due process).
71. Lankford, 500 U.S. at 127 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-
87 (1984)). In Lankford, the Court explained that a capital defendant may not be "denied
the benefit of the adversary process" in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Id.
Similarly, in Ake, the Court noted that "fundamental fairness entitles indigent
defendants to 'an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary
system."' 470 U.S. at 77 (citation omitted) (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
612 (1974)).
72. See supra note 65-67 and accompanying text.
73. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362 (plurality opinion). In Gardner, the sentencing judge
relied, in part, on a presentence report in imposing the death penalty. Id. at 352-53
(plurality opinion). The report contained a confidential section which the State did not
disclose to the defendant. Id. at 353 (plurality opinion). The Court held that the State
violated the defendant's due process rights by sentencing him to death on the basis of
information which he "had -o opportunity to deny or explain." Id. at 362 (plurality
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A state may also violate a defendant's due process rights even when
it gives the defendant the opportunity to rebut the prosecution's case.
When the prosecution introduces evidence or argument which may
have inappropriately influenced the jury despite the defendant's
rebuttal, the Court applies a, fundamental fairness test.74 In this
situation, the Court will reverse a conviction or a death sentence if "the
admission of evidence ...so infected the ...proceeding with
unfairness as to render the [result] a denial of due process.""
opinion).
See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986) (noting that the
opportunity to deny or explain is an "elemental due process requirement").
74. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2012 (1994) (applying the test to a
prosecutor's remark in his closing statement); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,
340 & n.7 (1985) (explaining that the prosecutor's suggestion that the appellate court
would correct an erroneous death sentence affected "fundamental fairness"); Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (applying the test to evidence introduced by
the prosecutor).
75. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2012. In Romano, the trial jury found the defendant guilty
of murder. Id. at 2008. In arguing for the death penalty, the prosecutor, in
contravention of state law, introduced evidence that the defendant had already received
the death penalty for a prior murder conviction. Id. The Romano jury imposed a second
death sentence. Id. The defendant appealed, claiming that the prosecutor's remark
constituted a denial of due process because it relieved the jurors of their sense of
responsibility to impose an appropriate sentence. Id. The Court affirmed Romano's
death sentence, concluding that the admission of the evidence in question did not deprive
the defendant of a fair sentencing proceeding. Id. at 2008-09.
The Romano Court relied on Donnelly for the standard it applied. Id. at 2012. In
Donnelly, the State prosecuted the defendant for first-degree murder. 416 U.S. at 639. In
his closing argument, the prosecutor suggested to the jury that the defense "hope[s] that
you find him guilty of something a little less than first-degree murder." Id. at 640. The
Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, concluding that the prosecutor's remark did
not "so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process." Id. at 643, 648.
The Donnelly Court explained that the Court examines criminal proceedings to
determine if the state's action jeopardized a defendant's rights under a specific provision
of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 643. If the Court finds a violation of a specific right, it will
take "special care" to ensure that state action does not infringe on that right. Id. Absent
a specific right, the Court will apply the fundamental unfairness test. Romano, 114 S.
Ct. at 2012.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, focused on fundamental unfairness in his
dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in Jacob v. Scott, 115 S. Ct. 711 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In Jacob, the defendant kidnapped a woman, and a co-
conspirator killed her. Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., dissenting). At Jacob's trial, the
prosecutor argued to the jury that Jacob killed the victim. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The jury convicted the defendant of murder and sentenced him to death. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). At the co-conspirator's later trial, the prosecutor admitted his mistake,
telling the co-conspirator's jury that Jacob had not killed the victim. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Jacob appealed, but the Fifth Circuit held his death sentence constitutional.
See id. at 711 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, dissenting from the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari, indicated that "it would be fundamentally unfair to execute a
person on the basis of a factual determination that the State has formally disavowed."
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1II. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments as placing substantial restrictions on the imposition of the
death penalty.76 In particular, the Due Process Clause guarantees a
capital defendant's right to a fair sentencing proceeding.77 When the
prosecution argues that a defendant poses a future danger to society if
not sentenced to death, fairness dictates that a state allow the defendant
to respond to that argument.78 In Simmons v. South Carolina, where
the State argued the defendant's future dangerousness, lower courts
refused to allow Simmons to present evidence that he would be
ineligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment.79 On review,
the Supreme Court held that a state may not hinder a defendant's due
process right to present evidence of parole ineligibility when the pro-
secution argues future dangerousness.8 0
A. The Facts of Simmons v. South Carolina
The defendant Jonathan Simmons beat to death an elderly woman.8'
Due to Simmons' prior felony convictions, South Carolina law ren-
dered him ineligible for parole if convicted of the woman's murder.82
Prior to jury selection for Simmons' murder trial, the trial court
granted the State's motion to bar the defense from asking any ques-
tions during voir dire regarding parole. 3 The jury convicted Simmons
Id. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. See supra part II.
77. See supra part II.B.
78. Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2194 (1994) (plurality opinion).
79. State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d 175, 179 (S.C. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2187
(1994).
80. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193-94 (plurality opinion); id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
81. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
82. Id. (plurality opinion). The week before his murder trial, Simmons "pleaded
guilty to first degree burglary and two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection
with prior assaults on [three] elderly women," id. (plurality opinion), one of whom was
his grandmother, Simmons, 427 S.E.2d at 177. Simmons' guilty pleas resulted in
convictions for violent offenses. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion). He
was sentenced to a life term and 30 days imprisonment. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d at 176.
Under South Carolina law, S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp.
1993), these convictions rendered the defendant parole ineligible if convicted of any
subsequent violent offenses. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
83. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion). The trial court stated, without
explanation, that it would not allow voir dire examination in regard to parole
eligibility. Joint Appendix at 6-7, Simmons, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (No. 92-9059).
Voir dire is defined as "the preliminary examination which the court and attorneys
make of prospective jurors to determine their qualification and suitability to serve as
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of murder.84
During the sentencing phase of the trial, 5 the State argued that
Simmons posed a threat of future dangerousness to society and,
therefore, should be put to death.86 The defense introduced testimony
that the defendant's dangerousness applied only to elderly women and
that he "had adapted well to prison life."87 The defense requested the
trial judge to instruct the jury that the term "life imprisonment" carried
no possibility of parole for Simmons.88 The trial judge rejected the
defense's request and also rejected an alternate request to instruct the
jury that the defendant would actually spend the balance of his natural
life in prison if sentenced to "life imprisonment."89
During its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge asking:
"Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of
parole?" 9 The trial judge responded that the jury should interpret the
sentence terms by their plain meaning. 9' The jury returned a sentence
jurors." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).
84. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
85. South Carolina employs a bifurcated capital sentencing procedure. See Simmons,
427 S.E.2d at 177-78. See also supra notes 37-39 for more detail on how states use
bifurcated trials.
86. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d at 177-78. Specifically, the prosecutor argued that "the
fact that [the death penalty] will deter him is plenty. That's all we are here to do is to
de[t]er him." Joint Appendix at 102, Simmons, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (No. 92-9059). He
further contended that the defendant would "prey on people who can't fight back, who
can't resist .... [L]ooking for the old. Looking for the infirm. Looking for someone
to victimize that can't hurt him .... He needs sex." Id. at 105. He also stated "[y]our
verdict should be a response of society to someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be
an act of self-defense." Id. at 110. He also directed the jury that "[wle are concerned
about what to do with him now that he is in our midst," id., and concluded his argument
with "[d]on't avoid your responsibility. It will be an act of self-defense," id. at 112.
87. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2191 (plurality opinion). Witnesses for the defense and
the State agreed that the defendant posed a continuing threat to elderly women. Id. at
2190. The trial court, however, precluded the defense from arguing that, because the
defendant was ineligible for parole, he would never encounter elderly women if sentenced
to life imprisonment. See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Simmons, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (No. 92-
9059).
88. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2191 (plurality opinion). The defense contended that the
jury would otherwise misconstrue the true meaning of "life imprisonment" as applied to
the defendant. Id. (plurality opinion). In support of its argument, the defense introduced
into evidence a survey which indicated that only a small percentage (7.1%) of South
Carolinians believed "life imprisonment" meant life without parole. Id. (plurality
opinion). See infra notes 211-13 for more information on this survey.
89. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2192 (plurality opinion).
90. Id. (plurality opinion).
91. Id. (plurality opinion). The judge's full response read: "You are instructed not to
consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching your verdict. Do not consider parole or
parole eligibility. That is not a proper issue for your consideration. The terms life
imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in their plan [sic] and ordinary
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of death.92
On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, Simmons claimed
that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury about his parole ineligi-
bility violated his Eighth Amendment and due process rights.93 The
court held that the trial judge's answer to the jury's query actually
informed the jury of the defendant's parole ineligibility. 9a Thus, the
court did not reach the merits of the defendant's constitutional
claims. 95
The United States Supreme Court granted Simmons' writ of
*96 TeCcertiorari. The Court vacated his death sentence,9" holding thatSouth Carolina had violated Simmons' due process rights.98
B. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality99 in Simmons based its holding on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'0° The plurality reasoned that
due process prohibits imposition of the death penalty when the
sentencer considers information which the defendant had no oppor-
tunity to deny or explain.'' The plurality explained that the sentencing
meaning." Id. (plurality opinion).
92. Id. (plurality opinion). The jury deliberated only 25 minutes after receiving the
judge's answer to its inquiry. Id. (plurality opinion).
93. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d at 178.
94. Id. at 179. The court stated: "[W]e conclude [that] the ... charge given in this
case satisfies in substance appellant's request for a charge on parole ineligibility." Id.
The court included little explanation for this conclusion, merely stating that "[tihe test
for sufficiency of a jury charge is what a reasonable juror would have understood the
charge to mean." Id. (citing State v. Bell, 406 S.E.2d 165 (S.C. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1038 (1992)). The court held: "We conclude [that] a reasonable juror would have
understood from the charge given that life imprisonment indeed meant life without
parole. We therefore find appellant's argument without merit." Id.
95. See id. at 178-79.
96. Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 57 (1993).
97. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
98. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99. Justice Blackmun wrote the plurality opinion, in which Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Souter joined. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
100. Id. (plurality opinion). The plurality declined to analyze the defendant's claim
under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2193 n.4 (plurality opinion). Justice Souter, joined
by Justice Stevens, joined the plurality opinion but also wrote separately to explain his
view that the Eighth Amendment serves as an alternate basis for vacating the defendant's
death sentence. Id. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor did not analyze
the defendant's Eighth Amendment claim in her separate concurrence, with which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. See id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
101. Id. at 2192-93 (plurality opinion) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362
(1977) (plurality opinion)). In Gardner, the Court held that the State violated the
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jury may have reasonably believed that Simmons would have been
eligible for parole if not sentenced to death. 0 2 Further, the State
repeatedly argued to the jury that Simmons would pose a future threat
to society if it did not impose a death sentence.'0 3 Therefore, the
plurality reasoned that the State secured the death penalty based, at
least in part, on the defendant's future dangerousness to society while
denying the defendant the opportunity to rebut that argument by
explaining his ineligibility for parole.""° Thus, the State violated the
defendant's due process rights.'0 5
defendant's due process rights because it sentenced him to death based, in part, on
information in a presentencing report which the defendant had not seen and, thus, had no
opportunity to deny or explain. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362 (plurality opinion).
102. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193 (plurality opinion). The plurality explained that
this misperception by the sentencing jury created a false choice between death and a
limited prison term. Id. (plurality opinion). See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying
text for the details of Simmons' sentencing proceeding.
103. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193 (plurality opinion). The plurality noted that the
State may properly place the issue of the defendant's future dangerousness before the
sentencer. Id. (plurality opinion); see also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5
(1986) (noting that consideration of a defendant's probable future behavior is
inevitable); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1003 n.17 (1983) (indicating that the
jury will properly consider the defendant's future behavior and the desirability of his
release into society); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(explaining that any sentencer must predict a defendant's probable future conduct). See
supra note 86 for the prosecutor's future dangerousness argument.
104. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193 (plurality opinion). The plurality indicated that
the actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence is "indisputably relevant" to the
sentencing jury's assessment of the defendant's future dangerousness. Id. at 2194
(plurality opinion). Thus, the defendant's parole ineligibility was "crucial to [the]
sentencing determination." Id. (plurality opinion). The trial court's refusal to allow the
defendant to proffer that information therefore "cannot be reconciled with . . . well-
established precedents interpreting the Due Process Clause." Id. (plurality opinion).
105. Id. at 2193-94 (plurality opinion) (citing Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5; Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977)). See supra note 63 for further discussion of the
Skipper case and note 73 for further discussion of the Gardner case.
The plurality analogized Simmons' situation to that of the defendants in Skipper, 476
U.S. at 5, and Gardner, 430 U.S. at 349. The Simmons plurality explained that, like the
defendants in Skipper and in Gardner, the State prevented Simmons from rebutting
evidence it used to secure the death penalty. While the Skipper Court based its holding
on the defendant's Eighth Amendment right to present all relevant mitigating evidence,
476 U.S. at 4-5, the Simmons plurality emphasized that the Due Process Clause also
compelled the result in Skipper. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194 (plurality opinion); see
also Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.1 (explaining that due process formed an alternate basis
for the Court's holding).
The Simmons plurality noted that the defendant in Skipper had a due process right to
rebut the prosecutor's future dangerousness argument by introducing evidence of his
positive adaptation to prison life. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194 (plurality opinion).
The plurality explained that Skipper stands for the proposition that, where the
prosecution relies on a prediction of future dangerousness in requesting the death
penalty, due process requires admission of the defendant's relevant evidence in rebuttal.
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The plurality acknowledged that the Court generally defers to the
State's judgment as to what information the sentencer should con-
sider.'0 6 Nevertheless, a defendant's due process right to deny or
explain the State's future dangerousness argument supersedes the
State's traditional power to prescribe sentencing factors."
The plurality also rejected the South Carolina Supreme Court's
conclusion that the trial judge adequately informed the jury of
Simmons' parole ineligibility.'08 Justice Blackmun explained that
most jurors do not understand the precise meaning of the term "life
imprisonment."' °9 He concluded that a reasonable juror may not have
understood the "plain and ordinary meaning" of life imprisonment to
constitute life without parole." 0
Finally, the plurality concluded that the State may choose the
method by which it informs the sentencer of the defendant's parole
ineligibility. The State may allow argument by defense counsel or an
instruction from the court."'
Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.l).
The Simmons plurality also focused on the Gardner Court's holding that the Due
Process Clause prohibits a state from sentencing a defendant to death on the basis of
information which the defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain. Gardner, 430
U.S. at 362 (plurality opinion).
106. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2196 (plurality opinion) (citing California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992, 1000 (1983)).
107. Id. at 2195 n.5 (plurality opinion). The plurality stated: "The Due Process
Clause will not tolerate placing a capital defendant in a straitjacket by barring him from
rebutting the prosecution's arguments of future dangerousness with the fact that he is
ineligible for parole under state law." Id. (plurality opinion).
The plurality rejected the State's argument that information about the defendant's
parole ineligibility would be misleading due to the possibility of commutation,
clemency, escape, or legislative changes. Id. at 2195 (plurality opinion). The plurality
reasoned that first, as the State admitted, the defendant was legally ineligible for parole.
Id. (plurality opinion). Second, the plurality noted that the State's argument was
undermined by the fact that most states which employ life imprisonment as an
alternative to the death penalty inform the sentencer of the defendant's parole
ineligibility. Id. (plurality opinion). The plurality's reference to other state practices
suggests that, because the states appear to be in consensus that parole ineligibility
information is not misleading, South Carolina's concerns are unfounded.
The plurality did, however, expressly limit its holding to situations where the
defendant is ineligible for parole: "In a State in which parole is available, how the
jury's knowledge of parole availability will affect the decision whether or not to impose
the death penalty is speculative, and we shall not lightly second-guess a decision
whether or not to inform a jury of information regarding parole." Id. at 2196 (plurality
opinion).
108. Id. at 2196-97 (plurality opinion). See supra part III.A for a summary of the
trial court proceedings and the South Carolina Supreme Court decision.
109. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2197 (plurality opinion).
110. Id. (plurality opinion).
I 11. Id. at 2196 (plurality opinion).
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C. The Three Concurring Opinions
1. Justice Souter's Concurrence
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens joined, filed a con-
curring opinion." 2 While both Justices joined the plurality opinion,"3
Justice Souter wrote separately to clarify his viewpoint on two issues.
First, he believed that the Eighth Amendment, in addition to the Due
Process Clause, compelled the Court's result." 4 Second, he argued
that the trial court should inform the jury of the defendant's parole
ineligibility, as opposed to relying on mere defense counsel
argument." 1
5
Justice Souter explained that the Eighth Amendment also predicates
a defendant's right to present parole ineligibility information.6 He
indicated that, because the Court has interpreted the Eighth Amend-
ment as requiring heightened reliability in capital sentencing
proceedings, defendants may demand accurate instruction on the
meaning of sentencing terms whenever the jury may reasonably mis-
understand such terms.' 17  Thus, Justice Souter argued that the
defendant's Eighth Amendment right turns on jury perceptions, and
not on the State's argument of future dangerousness." 8
Justice Souter agreed with Justice Blackmun that juries, in general,
are likely to misunderstand the meaning of the term "life imprison-
ment.""' 9 Therefore, he argued, to ensure reliability in capital
sentencing, the Eighth Amendment requires courts to instruct juries as
to the precise meaning of life imprisonment. 20 While he joined the
112. Id. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
114. Id. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring). See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying
text for the plurality's analysis; see infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text for
Justice O'Connor's concurring viewpoint.
115. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198-99 (Souter, J., concurring). See supra note 11l
and accompanying text for the plurality's conclusion; see infra note 136 and
accompanying text for Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
116. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring).
117. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
118. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 2199 (Souter, J., concurring). See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying
text for the plurality's viewpoint; see infra note 135 and accompanying text for Justice
O'Connor's concurring position.
120. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2199 (Souter, J., concurring). Because the plurality did
not reach the Eighth Amendment issue, it did not decide whether the term "life
imprisonment" adequately achieves reliability. The plurality instead focused on whether
the jury's perception of the meaning of the term gave the jury adequate information
about the defendant's future dangerousness. Id. at 2197-98 (plurality opinion).
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plurality in holding that, at a minimum, states should permit defense
counsel to provide the sentencer with parole ineligibility information,
Justice Souter wrote separately to argue that a jury instruction would
better serve to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.'2'
2. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg, who also joined the plurality opinion, 122 filed a
short separate concurring opinion clarifying her view that "[t]his case
is most readily resolved under a core requirement of due process, the
right to be heard."'' 23  She explained that South Carolina denied
Simmons a full and fair opportunity to rebut the State's argument of
future dangerousness. 24 She agreed with the plurality that the defen-
dant's opportunity to rebut the prosecution's argument must include
the right to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. 25  Justice
Ginsburg also explained that both the plurality and Justice O'Connor
in a separate concurrence concluded that the Due Process Clause
allows either the trial court or defense counsel to convey parole
ineligibility information to the sentencer 26
3. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only. 27 Justice
O'Connor did not explicitly indicate her reason for declining to join the
121. Id. at 2198-99 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter explained that "on
matters of law, arguments of counsel do not effectively substitute for statements by the
court. '[Airguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do
instructions from the court."' Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (alteration in original)
(quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990)).
122. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
123. Id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
690 (1986)).
124. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
125. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text
for the plurality's explanation of this right. See also infra notes 130-31 and
accompanying text for Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
126. Compare Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("Justice
O'Connor's opinion clarifies that the due process requirement is met if the relevant
information is intelligently conveyed to the jury; ... I do not read Justice Blackmun's
opinion to say otherwise.") with id. at 2196 (plurality opinion) ("[D]ue process plainly
requires that he be allowed to bring it to the jury's attention by way of argument by
defense counsel or an instruction from the court.") and with id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("I agree with the Court that in such a case the defendant should be
allowed to bring his parole ineligibility to the jury's attention-by way of argument by
defense counsel or an instruction from the court-as a means of responding to the State's
showing of future dangerousness.").
127. Id. at 2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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plurality opinion, but she apparently disagreed with the broad scope of
the plurality's holding.t28 In contrast to the plurality, Justice
O'Connor explicitly limited the Court's holding to the factual situation
before it, finding that a capital defendant has a due process right to
inform the jury of his or her parole ineligibility only when the
prosecutor specifically argues future dangerousness. 2 9
Justice O'Connor confirmed that due process requires states to
allow capital defendants to rebut the prosecution's case.13 She
explained that, where the prosecution specifically relies on future
dangerousness in asking for the death penalty, due process guarantees
a defendant's right to introduce evidence to rebut that argument. 131
Like the plurality, Justice O'Connor acknowledged the Court's typical
deference to the states regarding sentencing factors. 32 She also agreed
with the plurality that due process does not warrant such deference
when a state prohibits the defendant from offering parole ineligibility
information to rebut evidence of future dangerousness. 33 Instead, she
asserted that due process protects a defendant's right to present such
information. 34
128. Justice Scalia pointed this out in his dissent. Id. at 2203 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion seems to
go further than Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
plurality indicated that the Due Process Clause requires states to admit the fact of parole
ineligibility even when the prosecution does not argue future dangerousness. Id. (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that if the prosecution
does not argue future dangerousness, the State may prohibit the defendant from
presenting parole ineligibility information). See also infra part IV.B for a comparison
of the plurality and concurring positions on whether Simmons extends to situations
where the state does not argue future dangerousness.
130. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Clemmons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 746 (1990)). See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying
text for the plurality's analysis in reaching this same conclusion.
131. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986)). Like the plurality, Justice O'Connor
emphasized the due process requirement mentioned by the Skipper Court, despite the
Skipper Court's reliance on the Eighth Amendment. See supra note 105. Justice
O'Connor suggested that Simmons' evidence in rebuttal of the State's future
dangerousness argument was even more probative than the defendant's evidence in
Skipper. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that,
unlike Skipper, who sought to introduce testimony regarding his good behavior,
Simmons sought to show that state law prohibited his eligibility for parole).
132. Id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf. id. at 2196 (plurality opinion)
(noting that the Court will generally defer to a state's determination as to what the jury
should be told about sentencing).
133. Id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See supra notes 106-07 and
accompanying text for the plurality's agreement with this point.
134. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
further explained that "the fact that [the defendant] will never be released from prison
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Justice O'Connor also agreed with the plurality that the trial judge's
instruction to interpret "life imprisonment" according to its plain and
ordinary meaning did not adequately inform the jury that the defendant
was ineligible for parole.'35 Finally, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
plurality that the state may choose a court instruction or a defense
counsel argument to inform the jury of the defendant's parole
ineligibility. 1
36
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, disagreeing
with the Court's holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment compelled the Court's decision. 31 Instead, Justice Scalia
suggested that state action denies a defendant due process only when
that action is "incompatible with our national traditions of criminal
procedure." 1
38
First, Justice Scalia argued that the United States has no uniform
current practice, amounting to a national tradition, of informing sen-
tencing juries of a defendant's parole ineligibility. 39 Second, Justice
Scalia criticized the plurality and Justice O'Connor for opining that the
jury based Simmons' death sentence, at least in part, on the basis of
his future dangerousness."4 Justice Scalia stated that he was "sure it
was the sheer depravity of [the] crimes," rather than the defendant's
future dangerousness, which prompted the jury to impose death.' 4 1
will often be the only way that a violent criminal can successfully rebut the State's
case." Id. at 2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also text accompanying notes 108-
10 (discussing the plurality opinion's treatment of the meaning of "life
imprisonment"). Justice O'Connor explained that life without parole is a recent
development in the country's long-standing practice of allowing parole release.
Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Therefore, common sense
indicates that jurors might not know whether a life sentence included the possibility of
parole. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that Simmons' jury was
apparently unaware that he was ineligible for parole, as evidenced by the question that
the jury sent to the judge. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 2201 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra notes 99-107, 130-35, and
accompanying text for the majority of the Justices' due process rationale.
138. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2202 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 2196 (plurality opinion)
(discussing the defendant's right to deny future dangerousness by showing that he was
ineligible for parole); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same). The plurality and
concurrence determined that the defendant's death sentence was based, at least in part, on
the defendant's future dangerousness. Id. at 2196 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 2202-03 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
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Therefore, Justice Scalia argued that due process does not provide the
defendant with the right to combat the prosecution's future dan-
gerousness argument with parole ineligibility information. 4 2
Justice Scalia emphasized the states' traditional authority to deter-
mine what constitutes evidence relevant to the sentencing decision.
43
He argued that, in this case, the State should retain that authority
unless the exclusion of parole ineligibility evidence renders the
sentencing proceeding "fundamentally unfair."' 44 He concluded that
South Carolina's prohibition on parole ineligibility information did not
render Simmons' sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair. 45
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority of Justices in Simmons agreed that South Carolina
denied the defendant his due process right to rebut the State's
argument of future dangerousness. 46 This Part analyzes the varying
constitutional concerns of the Justices. It compares the plurality's and
Justice Ginsburg's due process analyses147 with Justice Souter's
Eighth Amendment approach 48 and Justice Scalia's fundamental fair-
ness test. 49 In addition, this Part discusses the practical scope of
Simmons in light of Justice O'Connor's narrow holding 50 and the
plurality's seemingly broad one. 5'
142. Id. at 2203 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S.
1, 11 (1986)). Justice Scalia explained that "[a]s a general matter, the Court leaves it to
the [s]tates to strike what they consider the appropriate balance among the many factors
... that determine whether evidence ought to be admissible." Id. at 2203-04 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia criticized the Court for effectively
creating a piecemeal "Federal Rules of Death Penalty Evidence." Id. at 2205 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
144. Id. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia drew the fundamental fairness
standard from the Court's decision in Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994). In
Simmons, Justice Scalia argued that the admission of evidence considered in Romano did
not differ from the exclusion of evidence before the Court. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2204
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2012). See supra note 75 for a
discussion of Romano and fundamental unfairness.
145. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia found "far-
fetched" the idea that the jury imposed the death penalty "just in case" Simmons might
be released on parole. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion); id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor largely agreed with the plurality's due process analysis in her separate
concurrence. See id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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A. The Varying Constitutional Concerns of the Justices
In Simmons, seven Justices 5 2 agreed that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment formed the basis for the defendant's
right to rebut the prosecutor's argument of future dangerousness. 15
3
Although the Justices agreed on the basis of the right, they differed on
the precise scope of the right.
54
The plurality's analysis rested on the defendant's right to rebut
information upon which the sentencer may have relied in imposing the
death penalty.15 5  The plurality concluded that a state must allow a
defendant to rebut the prosecution's argument of future dangerousness
by informing the jury of his or her parole ineligibility. 5 6
Justice O'Connor agreed with this reasoning, explaining that "the
fact that he will never be released from prison will often be the only
way that a violent criminal can successfully rebut the State's case. '
Both opinions noted the Court's traditional deference to the states
regarding informing the jury of early release, 158 but found that defer-
ence inapplicable when a state's practice violates the defendant's
constitutional rights. 59 Justice Ginsburg, joining the plurality, wrote
separately to clarify her view that the right to be heard is the
fundamental due process protection which underlies the defendant's
right to rebut, deny, and explain the State's argument. 60 Thus, a
152. Justice Blackmun wrote the plurality opinion, in which Justices Souter,
Stevens, and Ginsburg joined. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring only in the judgment, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. See infra part V.B.
155. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194 (plurality opinion). In particular, the plurality
noted that the "petitioner was prevented from rebutting information that the sentencing
authority considered, and upon which it may have relied, in imposing the sentence of
death." Id. (plurality opinion).
156. Id. at 2196 (plurality opinion).
157. Id. at 2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that "one of the
hallmarks of due process in our adversary system is the defendant's ability to meet the
State's case against him." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
158. The plurality explained that the Court "generally will defer to a State's
determination as to what a jury should and should not be told about sentencing." Id. at
2196 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor noted that "[t]he decision whether or not to
inform the jury of the possibility of early release is generally left to the States." Id. at
2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 2196 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683, 690 (1986) (observing that an essential component of procedural fairness is an
opportunity to be heard and that the opportunity is "empty" if the State excludes
evidence that is central to the defendant's claim). See supra part II.B. for more detail on
this due process right.
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majority of the Justices held that due process requires a state to allow a
defendant to present parole ineligibility information to the sentencer
when the State argues future dangerousness.
1 6
'
The dissent 62 disagreed with the Court's due process analysis,
contending that the Due Process Clause should play no role in dictating
states' substantive sentencing laws in the absence of "fundamental
unfairness.' 63 Justice Scalia argued that, contrary to the assertions of
the plurality and concurrences,"64 the jury did not sentence the defen-
dant to death on the basis of information which the defendant could not
deny or explain. 65  Instead, Justice Scalia found "far-fetched" the
notion that the jury relied on future dangerousness in sentencing the
defendant to death."6 Therefore, he concluded that the due process
precedents cited by the plurality were inapposite. 1
67
Justice Scalia instead based his analysis on a "fundamental
unfairness" standard. 68 He concluded that the South Carolina prohi-
bition against informing the jury of the defendant's parole ineligibility
was not "fundamentally unfair" and, thus, the Court should affirm the
defendant's death sentence.
169
Only Justice Souter,170 who joined the plurality but wrote a separate
concurrence, discussed the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to
the defendant's claim. 71 Justice Souter argued that, because the
161. Justice Blackmun wrote the plurality opinion, in which Justices Souter,
Stevens, and Ginsburg joined. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion); Justice
O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring only in the judgment, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. Id. at 2201 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
163. Id. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text for the plurality and concurring
positions.
165. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Cf. supra note 155 and
accompanying text.
166. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2202 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra part III.B-C.
168. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra note 75 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2012
(1994), from which Justice Scalia drew the fundamental unfairness standard.
169. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2204-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note, however, that
the Court has typically limited the application of the fundamental fairness standard in
review of death sentences to situations where the defendant claims that evidence or
argument introduced by the prosecutor prejudiced the defendant despite the defendant's
opportunity to rebut. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
170. Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Stevens joined.
Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198 (Souter, J., concurring).
171. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). The plurality, on the other hand, "express[ed] no
opinion on the question whether the result . . . is also compelled by the Eighth
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Eighth Amendment requires heightened reliability in capital sen-
tencing,172 states must instruct the jury on the true meaning of
sentencing terms. Thus, he argued that courts should instruct the jury
whether "life imprisonment" carries with it a possibility of parole,
regardless of whether the prosecutor argues the defendant's future
dangerousness.17 3 However, because the majority of Justices did not
adopt this view, the due process analysis discussed above governs the
Simmons holding.
B. The Scope of Simmons
The plurality opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence appear to
differ on the issue of exactly when the Constitution requires states to
allow defendants to introduce evidence of parole ineligibility. 174 The
opinions agree that this result applies when the State specifically
argues to the sentencer that the defendant will be a future danger to
society.17 1 Justice O'Connor explicitly limited her opinion to this
situation, 176 thus narrowing the Court's holding to the specific facts
before it.
The language of the plurality opinion, however, suggests a much
broader holding. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the
plurality appears to require the admission of parole ineligibility even
when the prosecution does not argue future dangerousness. 77 The
plurality stated that where the defendant's future dangerousness is "at
issue," due process requires that a state give the defendant the oppor-
tunity to inform the sentencing jury of his or her parole ineligibility.178
Amendment." Id. at 2193 n.4 (plurality opinion).
172. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text for the Eighth Amendment
reliability requirement.
173. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198-99 (Souter, J., concurring).
174. See supra notes 99-105, 128-31, and accompanying text.
175. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193 (plurality opinion); id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), provided a factually similar
precedent for this holding. See id. at 3. Skipper differed, however, in two important
respects. First, the State in Skipper presented evidence and argument about the
defendant's future dangerousness, as opposed to the mere argument proffered in
Simmons. Id. at 2. Second, the Skipper Court based its holding on the Eighth
Amendment, noting in dicta that the Due Process Clause applied as well. Id. at 5 & n. 1.
See supra note 63 for more detail on the Skipper decision.
176. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2201 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
stated that "if the prosecution does not argue future dangerousness, the State may
appropriately decide that parole is not a proper issue for the jury's consideration even if
the only alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of
parole." Id. at 2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 2203 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
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The plurality recognized that future dangerousness is "at issue" even
when the State does not argue the point because "a defendant's future
dangerousness bears on all sentencing determinations."'' 79 Thus, the
plurality did not limit its holding to situations where the prosecution
specifically argues future dangerousness. Despite the broad scope
suggested by the plurality, the Court's holding in Simmons is limited
to situations where the State specifically argues future dangerousness
because a majority of Justices agreed only with this more limited
holding.180
The majority of Justices also agreed that both defense counsel
argument and court instruction as to the defendant's parole ineligibility
adequately protect the defendant's due process rights.' 8 ' Justice
Souter's concurrence argued that the Court should require the trial
judge to tender that information because "arguments of counsel do not
effectively substitute for statements by the court."'182 The difference of
opinion on this point appears to rest on the alternate constitutional
basis for the decision discussed by Justice Souter.
Justice Souter stated that the Eighth Amendment requires states to
precisely define the term "life imprisonment" for the sentencer' 83 As
the duty to define sentencing terms generally lies with the trial court,
Justice Souter advocated placing the burden of defining life imprison-
ment on the trial court.'84 The plurality and Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, however, did not reach the Eighth Amendment issue'
85
and, therefore, did not analyze the need for precise definition of
sentencing terms. Instead, they held that due process guarantees
capital defendants the right to rebut the prosecution's argument of
future dangerousness. 8 6 Therefore, the majority of Justices held that
due process tolerates either court instruction or defense counsel
179. Id. at 2193 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). The plurality noted that "'any
sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct .... '
Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (plurality
opinion)).
180. Although Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Kennedy
joined in the judgment, they declined to join in the plurality opinion. Id. at 2200
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The plurality opinion consisted of only four justices. Id. at
2190 (plurality opinion).
181. See id. at 2196 (plurality opinion) (stating that a state may permit either court
instruction or defense counsel argument); id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that a state may permit either court instruction or defense counsel argument).
182. Id. at 2198-99 (Souter, J., concurring).
183. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
184. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 2193 n.4 (plurality opinion); id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 2194 (plurality opinion); id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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argument to provide the jury with sufficient rebuttal information."l
V. IMPACT
A. The Current Impact of Simmons
Even when held to its precise facts, the Simmons decision will
change the present law in several states and clarify the law in several
others. Prior to Simmons, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Virginia specifically denied capital defendants the opportunity to
inform the sentencing jury of parole ineligibility.' 81 Simmons will
operate to change the law in these states. Defendants who are ineli-
gible for parole under state law will now have the right to inform the
sentencing jury in capital sentencing proceedings where the prose-
cution argues future dangerousness.
Prior to Simmons, Florida, South Dakota, and Wyoming were
undecided concerning the appropriateness of parole eligibility as a
subject for sentencing jury consideration.'89 In these states, Simmons
will clarify and affirmatively protect capital defendants' rights.
Simmons may also affect defendants' rights in four additional states:
Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska. These states leave the capital
sentencing decision in the hands of a judge or a panel of judges. 9 °
While judges in these states previously were presumably aware of the
defendant's parole eligibility status, Simmons now clarifies that due
process requires judges to weigh a defendant's parole ineligibility as a
factor militating against the imposition of death.
187. Id. at 2196 (plurality opinion); id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
188. See Commonwealth v. Henry, 569 A.2d 929, 941 (Pa. 1990) (holding that
parole is not a proper consideration for a sentencing jury), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931
(1991); State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315, 321 (S.C. 1991) (Chandler, J., concurring)
(joined by a majority of Justices, prohibiting capital sentencing juries from receiving
parole information); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 491, 507 (Va.) (rejecting the
defendant's contention that he should be entitled to inform his capital sentencing jury of
his parole ineligibility), cert. denied, O'Dell v. Virginia, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).
189. Statutory and decisional laws in Florida, South Dakota, and Wyoming are silent
on whether the defendant may inform the jury of his or her parole ineligibility. FLA.
STAT. ch. 775.082(1) (Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 24-15-4 (1988); WYO.
STAT. §§ 6-2-101(b), 7-13-402(a) (Supp. 1994). The Florida Supreme Court, however,
approved for publication pattern jury instructions which inform capital sentencing
juries of the sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 25 years. See Standard
Jury Instructions-Criminal Cases, 603 So. 2d 1175, 1201 (Fla. 1992).
190. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(d)-(f)
(1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1989).
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One state has already applied Simmons beyond its precise facts to a
situation where state law did not render the defendant ineligible for
parole. In Clark v. Tansy,'9' a New Mexico jury convicted the defen-
dant of kidnapping and 'murder, and sentenced him to death. 192 In
arguing for the death penalty, the prosecutor told the jury that the
defendant posed a future danger to society and suggested that the
defendant might be eligible for parole in ten years. 93 However, the
defendant would have actually been eligible for parole, at the earliest,
in fifty-five years. 194 Relying on the plurality's rationale in Simmons,
the New Mexico Supreme Court vacated the defendant's death
sentence.195 The court reasoned that "[tjhe jury must have had a
fundamental misunderstanding of the alternatives it faced."'' 96 There-
fore, the State violated the defendant's due process rights by securing
a death sentence on the basis of the defendant's future dangerousness,
while concealing the true meaning of the non-capital alternatives. 97
Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court extended Simmons to a
situation where the defendant was eligible for parole.
Nevertheless, not all states have extended Simmons beyond its
precise holding. In State v. Price,98 the North Carolina Supreme
Court rejected the application of Simmons to a defendant who was
technically eligible for parole.' 99 The court reasoned that Simmons
applies only to capital defendants whom state law renders ineligible for
parole.2"° Thus, the court declined to adopt an expansive reading of
191. 882 P.2d 527 (N.M. 1994).
192. Id. at 529.
193. Id. at 530.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 536.
196. Id. at 533.
197. Id. (quoting Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193 (plurality opinion)).
198. 448 S.E.2d 827 (N.C. 1994), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995) (No.
94-7672).
199. Id. at 831. When convicted of murder in North Carolina, the defendant was
already serving a life sentence in Virginia. Id. at 828. Defense counsel requested
permission to argue to the jury that the court could impose a life sentence which would
begin at the end of the life sentence imposed by Virginia. Id. Defense counsel reasoned
that such a sentence, in effect, would force the defendant to spend the rest of his natural
life in prison and, thus, that Simmons controlled. Id.
200. Id. at 831; accord Allridge v. Scott, 41 F.3d 213, 221-22 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding Simmons inapplicable because state law did not render the defendant
technically ineligible for parole); Kinnamon v. Scott, 40 F.3d 731, 733 (5th Cir.)
(restricting Simmons to "cases in which the sentencing alternative to death is life
without parole"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 660 (1994); Burgess v. State, 450 S.E.2d 680,
693 (Ga. 1994) (limiting Simmons to situations where state law would prohibit a
defendant's release on parole); State v. Robinson, 451 S.E.2d 196, 206 (N.C. 1994)
(confining Simmons to cases in which the defendant would not be eligible for parole);
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Simmons to include defendants who are de facto parole ineligible.
In addition, the South Carolina Supreme Court refused to apply
Simmons to a case where the prosecution agreed to refrain from
arguing future dangerousness. 20 ' The court reasoned that the prose-
cutor had not placed the defendant's future dangerousness at issue
and, therefore, rejected Simmons as inapposite.2 2
B. Future Implications of Simmons
As Clark demonstrates, the future implications of Simmons reach
beyond its precise holding.20 3 The Court may extend Simmons to
require states to allow capital defendants to inform the sentencing jury
of their parole ineligibility even when the State does not argue future
dangerousness-as suggested by the Simmons plurality.2"4 Justice
O'Connor's concurrence did not adopt this viewpoint, but instead
limited the Court's holding to the precise facts before the Court.20 5
Nevertheless, following the logic of the plurality, a majority of Jus-
tices may extend Simmons when the issue before the Court is a
defendant's right to present parole ineligibility information in the
absence of State argument of future dangerousness.
The Court has clearly endorsed the view that capital sentencing
juries should and do consider factors outside those specifically
State v. Payne, 448 S.E.2d 93, 99-100 (N.C. 1994) (finding Simmons inapplicable
when a defendant is eligible for parole); State v. Bacon, 446 S.E.2d 542, 558-59 (N.C.
1994) (recognizing Simmons, but finding it inapplicable in states where the defendant
would eventually be eligible for parole), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3626 (U.S. Feb. 21,
1995) (No. 94-7039); State v. Skipper, 446 S.E.2d 252, 275-76 (N.C. 1994) (holding
Simmons inapplicable because, under state law, the defendant would eventually be
eligible for parole), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 953 (1995); Cardwell v. Commonwealth,
450 S.E.2d 146, 155 (Va. 1994) (stating that Simmons does not apply when the
defendant is eligible for parole); Wright v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 361, 363 (Va.
1994) (holding that Simmons does not affect a defendant who is eligible for parole);
Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 360, 361 (Va. 1994) (applying Simmons only
to cases where the defendant would not be eligible for parole); see also Ingram v. Zant,
26 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1994) (holding Simmons inapposite because Georgia
law did not provide for life without parole at the time the jury sentenced the defendant),
cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3626 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1995) (No. 94-7318).
201. State v. Southerland, 447 S.E.2d 862, 868 (S.C. 1994), cert. denied, 63
U.S.L.W. 3626 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1995) (No. 94-7302).
202. Id. As a secondary matter, the court also explained that defense counsel argued
throughout the sentencing proceeding that the defendant would never be released from
prison. Id.; see also Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1385
n.5 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that Simmons does not impose an affirmative duty on the
State to present parole ineligibility evidence to the sentencer).
203. See supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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presented by the State or defense counsel.20 6 The Constitution, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not require the capital sen-
tencing jury to ignore factors which the parties do not present.20 7
Instead, the jury may consider a myriad of factors, 20 8 including future
dangerousness, regardless of whether the State argues the issue.20 9
Furthermore, as the Court has acknowledged, 2'0 empirical evidence
demonstrates that juries place heavy emphasis on the defendant's
future dangerousness in deciding whether to impose the death
penalty.21
206. See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
207. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 164 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
208. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1983). See also Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983) (noting that the jury should not decide such an issue in a
vacuum).
209. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (remarking that
sentencing juries inevitably consider future dangerousness); Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1003
n. 17 (noting that the sentencing jury should properly consider the defendant's potential
for reform and release); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(explaining that any sentencing authority must predict probable future conduct); see also
Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193 (plurality opinion) (explaining that "a defendant's future
dangerousness bears on all sentencing determinations .... " (emphasis added)).
Simmons does not hold that sentencing juries may not consider a defendant's future
dangerousness if the prosecution does not argue the issue. Rather, the Simmons
plurality implies that a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue regardless of
whether the State forwards that argument. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
210. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2197 n.9 (plurality opinion) (citing with approval
empirical studies which indicate the importance of future dangerousness to jury
deliberations); see also Jurek, 428 U.S. at 275-76 (plurality opinion) (holding that a
state may require the jury to consider future dangerousness because such a requirement is
"no different from the task performed countless times each day throughout the American
system of criminal justice").
211. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror
Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1993) for one such study. The
article discusses the results of a survey of 114 South Carolina jurors who participated in
31 capital sentencing proceedings. Id. at 3. The authors conclude that "[e]xpectations
about future dangerousness play a substantial role in juror deliberations." Id. at 4.
Furthermore, jurors usually conclude that the defendant will be dangerous. Id. at 6. This
conclusion is evidenced by the 95% of jurors who found future dangerousness in cases
where death was imposed as opposed to the 74% of jurors who found future
dangerousness in cases where life imprisonment was imposed. Id. at 6-7.
See also William W. Hood III, Note, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its
Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1623-24 & n.102
(1989) (citing National Legal Research Group, Inc., Jury Research and Trial Simulation
Services, Report on Jurors' Attitudes Concerning the Death Penalty (Dec. 6, 1988)
(unpublished report)) (interpreting a survey of Virginia residents as indicating that 79%
of the population believe that the actual length of the defendant's prison term if
sentenced to life imprisonment is important to the decision of whether to impose death);
Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning
Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 211, 222-
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In addition, the true meaning of "life imprisonment" eludes juries.
Studies indicate that most people believe that a defendant sentenced to
"life imprisonment" will actually serve much less than a life term.
212
Therefore, any jury which decides between "death" and "life imprison-
ment" may sentence a parole ineligible defendant to death on the
erroneous belief that he or she would actually serve only a few years
of a life sentence.213
The Simmons plurality recognized the possibility of this mis-
perception about the true duration of a life sentence, stating that a jury,
uninformed about the defendant's parole ineligibility, would be forced
to make a false choice between death and a limited prison term.21 4
Because juries generally consider future dangerousness,2 5 but
generally misunderstand the true meaning of life imprisonment,2 6 the
Court may eventually decide that defendants have the right to present
parole ineligibility information in all cases, regardless of whether the
23 (1987) (discussing a survey of a capital defendant's veniremen in Georgia in which
two-thirds of the potential jurors stated that they would be more likely to impose a
sentence of life if assured that the defendant would serve at least 25 years). Simmons'
defense counsel conducted a survey of 504 South Carolina residents. Joint Appendix at
152, Simmons, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (No. 92-9059). More than three-quarters of
those surveyed (76.5%) responded that the actual length of a defendant's prison term
would be extremely or very important to their decision of whether to impose the death
penalty. Id. at 155 tbl. 3.
212. For example, in Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 211, survey respondents were
asked: "How long did you think someone not given the death penalty for a capital
murder in this state usually spends in prison before returning to society?" Id. at 7. The
mean answer for jurors involved in death cases was a mere 16.8 years. Id. Compare that
term to the 23.8-year mean for jurors who served on juries which imposed life
imprisonment. Id.
Hood, supra note 211, at 1624, found the same low estimation of the actual duration of
a life imprisonment term. On average, the respondents expected only a 10-year prison
sentence. Id. at 1624. In Paduano & Smith, supra note 211, the respondents expected
only a seven-year term, on average. Id. at 222.
In the study conducted by Simmons' defense counsel, 32% of respondents believed that
defendants would serve between 10 and 19 years for a life sentence. Joint Appendix at
154 tbl. 2, Simmons, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (No. 92-9059).
213. See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 211, at 4, 7 (concluding that misguided fears
of early release generate death sentences because jurors who believe that the alternative
to death is a relatively short time in prison tend to impose a sentence death).
214. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193 (plurality opinion). The plurality further
explained that the jury may have reasonably entertained a "grievous misperception" that
the defendant would be eligible for parole, thus "creating a false choice between
sentencing [the defendant] to death and sentencing him to a limited period of
incarceration." Id. (plurality opinion).
215. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text; see also Simmons, 114 S. Ct.
at 2193 (plurality opinion) (stating that "a defendant's future dangerousness bears on all
sentencing determinations made in our criminal justice system").
216. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
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prosecution specifically argues future dangerousness.1 7
Not only does this conclusion logically flow from Simmons, the
plurality itself suggested this result." 8 The plurality did not limit its
holding to cases where the State argues future dangerousness, but
rather extended its rationale to all cases where future dangerousness is
"at issue., 219 As discussed above, future dangerousness is "at issue"
in all capital sentencing proceedings because juries consider it as a
factor. 2' Therefore, the defendant should have a due process right to
"deny" future dangerousness in all cases by informing the jury of his
or her parole ineligibility.22' If a state prevents the defendant from
tendering this parole information, the defendant will be "prevented
from rebutting information that the sentencing authority considered,
and upon which it may have relied, in imposing the sentence of
death. 222 The Court's recognition that "the practical and human
limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored"223 supports this
conclusion. States which prevent a defendant from informing the jury
of his or her parole ineligibility deny the defendant the right to rebut
the jury's consideration of future dangerousness. As a "practical and
human" matter,224 the jury will consider future dangerousness even
when the prosecution does not raise the issue.225
Furthermore, the Court has held that: "'[s]tates cannot limit the
sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance that could cause
it to decline to impose the [death] penalty.'"226 The Simmons plurality
recognized that the defendant's parole ineligibility meets this
criterion.227 Therefore, because a defendant's parole ineligibility
217. See also Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 211, at 8 (arguing that states should
accurately inform jurors about the non-death alternative because expected non-death
sentences play a major role in sentencing deliberations).
218. See supra part IV.B.
219. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion).
220. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
221. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2196 (plurality opinion) (explaining that truthful
information about parole ineligibility allows the defendant to deny future
dangerousness).
222. Id. at 2194 (plurality opinion).
223. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
226. Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2009 (1994) (quoting McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987)).
227. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194 (plurality opinion) ("IT]he actual duration of
the defendant's prison sentence is indisputably relevant. Holding all other factors
constant, it is entirely reasonable for a sentencing jury to view a defendant who is
eligible for parole as a greater threat to society than a defendant who is not."); see also
Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 211, at 4 ("Holding other factors constant, a defendant
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serves as a basis for a sentence of less than death, the Court may
extend Simmons to situations where the State does not argue future
dangerousness when that issue is presented to the Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina
safeguards a capital defendant's right to a fair sentencing proceeding.
The Court declared that when the prosecution argues that the defendant
will be a future danger to society in asking for the death penalty, a state
may not prohibit the defendant from informing the sentencer of the fact
that he or she is ineligible for parole.228 Due process guarantees capital
defendants this opportunity to rebut the prosecution's argument.229
The Court further determined that either an instruction from the trial
court or argument by defense counsel satisfies the due process
requirement.230 Simmons grants capital defendants the right to ensure
that the sentencer makes an informed choice between the death penalty
and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, at least when
the prosecutor argues future dangerousness. 23  As the plurality
suggests, however, the Court may eventually extend Simmons to
ensure that capital sentencers are always fully informed of their
sentencing alternatives.232
MARY ZAUG
likely to be released after a shorter time could be viewed as more dangerous than the same
defendant expected to serve a longer sentence."). Perception of a defendant's future
dangerousness is a relevant circumstance that could cause the jury to decline to impose
death.
228. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190 (plurality opinion); id. at 2201 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
229. See id. at 2196 (plurality opinion); id. at 2200-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230. Id. (plurality opinion); id. at 2199 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2200-01
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
231. See supra parts Ill-IV.
232. See supra part V.
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